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1. An introduction, concerning the origin of the cosmos 
2.  
I am sitting by the table, contemplating on philosophical theories concerning the 
origin of the cosmos. Although I tried to convince myself that there must be one 
plausible theory among them, none of these theories could hold its ground when 
confronting my doubts.For the purpose of clarity, I will use terms as “thing” and 
“being” indifferently simply referring some existence in the cosmos. This includes 
physical existence, ideas and phenomena. 
  
To begin with, I looked at the cosmological theory. This school is championed by 
Descartes, who in the third meditation of his Meditations on First Philosophy, argues 
the following points. Descartes believes that “something cannot arise from nothing”, 
thus everything must have a cause. Furthermore, this cause here must contain more 
formal reality, as he argues “Now, it is manifest by the natural light that there must at 
least be as much formal reality in the cause as in its effect; for whence can the effect 
draw its reality if not from its cause ?1” Here formal reality means existence. Since it 
is not possible to compare the existence of a being to the existence of another being in 
terms of extent (to exist is a binary operation that only returns discrete value of true(1) 
and false (0), not an extent, which lies within a continuous array of (0,1)), what 
Descartes suggests shall then apply to sets. That is, to compare the reality of a cause 
with its effect is to compare the number of occurrences of beings that are contained in 
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the cause with the number of occurrences of beings in total , and Descartes claims that 
the reality of the cause is at least as great as the reality of the effect. However, this 
claim is somewhat problematic. To elaborate a little on this point, assume the contrary, 
that there is a causal relationship between A and B, where A and B are sets of beings, 
and the number of occurrence of beings in A is smaller than the number of occurrence 
of being in B. Descartes claims that this scenario is impossible, for that there will be 
certain beings in B that are not caused by anything in A. But this would imply 
causality being a one to one and onto (injective and surjective—a bijective 
relationship) relationship. To be more specific, assume set A ={a, b, c} and B = {w, x, 
y, z}. Since A (sufficiently and necessarily) causes B, we can find a mapping f from A 
onto B, and f(a)=w, f(b)=x, f(c)=y. Now it seems that z in B has no cause in A, which 
Descartes perceives as a contradiction, which will make our assumption false. 
However, this is not necessarily the case, for z can still be caused by any elements in 
A. This would only make a being in A causes more than one being in B, but this is 
hardly a problem. For example, if I eat an apple, this act would have at least two 
effects, that the apple ceases its existence, and my hunger ceases its existence. 
Therefore, there is no necessary contradiction when assuming the contrary, and 
Descartes’s resulting claim that “something would arise from nothing” will not 
necessarily hold.  
 
However, even if we abandon Descartes’s argument on different levels of reality in 
effects and causes, there are still some problems in Cosmological argument. As a 
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thing must have its cause, its cause should also have a cause. Following this logic, we 
would end up with an infinite chain of causes. For any arbitrary being A there exists a 
being B such that B causes A. To settle this, a cosmologist shall either assume the 
infinity of the cosmos or assert a first cause. Aristotle, for example, suggests the latter, 
that there is a first mover, and this first mover starts this whole chain of causality. This 
is also echoed by Descartes, who claims “And although an idea may give rise to 
another idea, this regress cannot, nevertheless, be infinite; we must in the end reach a 
first idea.2”  
 
However, since the rule that anything must have a cause is still valid, it is 
reasonable to ask what the cause of the first cause is. If we arbitrarily assert that the 
first cause has no cause and comes from nothing, then we would create an exception 
for our universal rule. This is rather a redundant tautology, as it simply asserts an 
origin of the cosmos without any supporting evidence. The first cause is true merely 
because we make it so. This involves a logical fallacy, and I will show it in the 
following example. If I assert the existence of an act that I eat an apple, as a 
consequence, we will have the existence of two effects, that the apple cease to exist, 
and that I no longer feel hungry. However, the act of me eating the apple is not 
verified but asserted. One only knows two facts, that the apple disappears and that I 
no longer feel hungry. But these two facts can be caused by something other than the 
act of me eating the apple. It could be the case that a pig eats the apple, and I eat the 





pig. There is no guarantee that the first cause that can results in the following effects 
is unique. This would allow a variety in first causes, but in that sense it is not the first 
cause anymore. Instead, what we have is an array of possible first causes. There can 
even exist possible causal relationship between these first causes, then how can one be 
certain which the actual first cause is?  
 
One might then claim that there is still one fact remains unchanged, that is, the 
existence of the first cause (whatever it might be). But as stated previously, this first 
cause is asserted arbitrarily. The existence of the first cause that one may argue as 
being unaffected by the previous objection is merely a result of the act that we assert 
such. I can very well assert the existence of a triangle with four sides, but this will not 
make such triangle come into being. To protect this objection, Leibniz reinforces the 
Cosmological argument by introducing the law of sufficient reason, which he states as 
“no fact can be real or existing and no statement true without a sufficient reason for its 
being so and not otherwise3”. Leibniz uses the principle to argue that the sufficient 
reason for the “series of things comprehended in the universe of creatures” must exist 
outside this series of contingencies (beings that either exist or not exist, which 
includes “creatures” ), which is the first cause (he calls it God). But his argument is 
not that different from what we discussed previously. In Leibniz’s theory, the first 
cause must exist because there is a sufficient reason for its existence. In this sense, the 
first cause is itself caused by its sufficient reason. Therefore this argument is simply a 
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shift of the first cause and does not significantly differ from the original Cosmological 
argument: it is under the attack of objections raised above. In Leibniz’s case, the 
sufficient reason of the existence of the first cause has two aspects, that we, as 
contingent creatures, understand the cosmos, and that the cause of contingent being 
cannot be a contingent being. Regardless of the question whether the first aspect of 
this sufficient reason is plausible, the second aspect is surely a mandatory assertion, 
making Leibniz’s account also under the objection that we proposed at the beginning 
of this paragraph. Although Leibniz’s attempt fails, he is in the correct direction. The 
argument of the first cause is extremely powerful, namely, whatever thing that one 
claims to be the basis of the cosmos, this thing necessarily becomes the first cause. To 
prevent the previously proposed objection, the only solution is to make such objection 
logically impossible, that is, impossible to ask for the cause of the first cause (or 
dismiss causality). This will be carefully discussed later. 
 
As the first cause assumption has been properly refuted, I shall now examine the 
only alternative left in the Cosmological theory. This states that there is no first cause. 
Instead, there exists infinite number of beings, and these beings form an infinite chain 
of causality. This idea is originally proposed by Hume as a critique to the traditional 
Cosmological theory. However, this statement necessarily implies an unproved axiom 
that asserts the infinity of the cosmos. Nevertheless, this is neither provable nor 
refutable. For in order to show the cardinality of a set is infinite, we must show that 
for an arbitrary natural number selected, this set must contain a subset whose 
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cardinality equals this selected natural number. That is to say, a set is infinite if and 
only if there is a bijection (1-1 and onto) relationship between this set and an infinite 
set. Therefore, to show our universe being infinite, we must show there is a bijective 
relationship between beings in the cosmos and elements in an infinite set. But now we 
would have a problem: in order to show the infinity of the cosmos, we must show the 
infinity of its corresponding set, and in order to show the infinity of the corresponding 
set, we must show the infinity of the corresponding set of the corresponding set. 
Again, this forms a chain similar to our causality chain, and it will have two 
consequences, that there is certain set asserted as being infinite, or this chain itself is 
infinite. In the first case, this asserted infinite set is the first cause, it address all those 
corresponding sets’ infinity, and thus the infinity of the universe. The infinity of the 
universe then serves as a solution to the first cause impasse, which is not valid at all, 
as it merely introduces another first cause instead of eliminating it. In the second case, 
we simply transfer the infinity of the cosmos to the infinity of corresponding sets, 
which still serves as the first cause. Therefore, the solution of infinite causality chain 
is indifferent from the first cause argument, and cannot save the Cosmological claim 
(although Hume does not intend to do so).     
 
Thus I have analyzed and rejected the cosmological theory. I shall then proceed and 
consider the ontological theory. This argument states that the cosmos is created by 
God. A good example of such argument is provided by Anselm, who claims that that 
firstly the idea of God states that God is perfect (and thus omnipotent). Secondly, 
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existence in reality is greater than existence in imagination. Therefore, the God in 
imagination is less perfect than the real God. Thus the real God, as a perfect being 
must exist. Finally, since God is all-powerful, he can certainly create the cosmos.  
 
Theories involving an all-powerful and most perfect God have a famous logical 
paradox, that is, “can God create a stone that he cannot lift?” If he can create such 
stone, he cannot lift it. Thus he is not all-powerful. If he cannot create such stone then 
he is also not all-powerful. Therefore God is not all-powerful in all circumstances and 
there exists something over which God could not exercise his might. It is thus 
reasonable to doubt that whether God truly has the power to create the cosmos. Apart 
from this, an immediate response to the Ontological argument will be: “why does God 
create the cosmos?”  Even if God indeed can create the cosmos, and he does exist, 
there is no necessity for him to conduct such act.  
 
Furthermore, the ontological theory must exclude God from the realm of the 
cosmos, otherwise he must create himself----an absurd proposition stating that God 
exists before its existence. This exclusion must be complete, that is, God must exist 
independently from the cosmos. If there is certain intersection between God and the 
cosmos, then when God creates the cosmos, he also creates this part. Therefore, this 
part only comes into existence when God creates it. However, as this part is also a 
part of God, it should exist before God creating the cosmos, and this would therefore 
form a contradiction. No part in the cosmos could be identical to any part of God, for 
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if they are identical, they would be the same, thus leading to this contradiction.  
Therefore, God must exist completely external to the cosmos. But the banishment of 
God is problematic as well. Since God exists externally to the universe, things in the 
cosmos cannot interact with God-----they are completely different and mutually 
exclusive. As a consequence, there will be no means of interaction that could happen 
between things in the cosmos and God. All that the Ontological argument has done is 
a game of definitions and logics (analytic propositions). It cannot in effect “prove” the 
existence of God. To prove its existence, we may adopt Kant’s terminology4, that is, 
we must provide an a priori account of synthetic propositions. However, there is no 
synthetic proposition concerning the existence of God, for God does not interact with 
the cosmos (stated above). Therefore, it is simply impossible to prove God’s existence: 
it remains as a mere idea, like unicorns or dragons. Then how could one state that 
such God creates the world? Aristotle may respond to this by stating his argument in 
the Physics, namely that God “creates” the world as the first mover because 
everything moves towards God as their nature of fulfilling their potential. But this 
claim states that God “creates” the world by mere existing, and the existence of God, 
as stated previously, is unable to prove. Therefore, this argument is also dubious.   
   
Now I have properly refuted two schools of thoughts, I shall finally consider the 
teleological theory. Hume in his Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion writes the 
following: 
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“Look round the world; contemplate the whole and every part of it: You will find it 
to be nothing but one great machine, subdivided into an infinite number of lesser 
machines, which again admit of subdivisions to a degree beyond what human senses 
and faculties can trace and explain. All these various machines, and even their most 
minute parts, are adjusted to each other with an accuracy which ravishes into 
admiration all men who have ever contemplated them. The curious adapting of means 
to ends, throughout all nature, resembles exactly, though it much exceeds, the 
productions of human contrivance; of human design, thought, wisdom, and 
intelligence. Since, therefore, the effects resemble each other, we are led to infer, by 
all the rules of analogy, that the causes also resemble; and that the Author of Nature is 
somewhat similar to the mind of man, though possessed of much larger faculties, 
proportioned to the grandeur of the work which he has executed. By this argument a 
posteriori, and by this argument alone, do we prove at once the existence of a Deity, 
and his similarity to human mind and intelligence.” 
 
Hume’s main idea states that everything complicated (“All these various 
machines….with an accuracy ….ever contemplated them”) is designed to exist (“the 
curious adapting of means to ends…..of human design, thought, wisdom, and 
intelligence.”) and since things are designed to exist, they must have their designer 
(“the Author of Nature”). Therefore the cosmos, as a complex thing, should also be 




In order to create this extremely complicated universe, the designer must know 
everything that the universe contains. This designer should therefore be an 
all-knowing God-like figure (“the Deity exists”). If I come up with a brand new 
invention, it must be designed by this all-knowing designer and delivered to my mind 
as a gift. It would therefore be reasonable to ask why people do not just sleep all day 
long, waiting for those great ideas and inventions coming out automatically in their 
minds. Why don’t ancient Greeks build a spaceship out of nowhere? It can be argued 
that God could intervene indirectly, that one as a human being is designed in such way 
that is capable of designing other things (as what Hume suggests). However, this will 
not dismiss the argument here. For things designed by one are only possible when this 
ability is designed by God. Therefore, the designs of things one creates are necessarily 
contained in the design of this individual. This is similar to the argument of causes 
and effects, where causes contain no less reality than the effect. Furthermore, if we 
denote the design of things that I (mistakenly) believe that I design as set D1, the 
design of me myself is D2, then as shown above, D2 necessarily contains D1, which 
means that every elements of D1 is also in D2. Therefore, designing D2 is also 
designing D1, and thus there is no difference between direct and indirect intervention. 
 
However, supporters of the teleological theory can argue that the evolving 
procedure of human society is also designed. It is determined by the great designer 
that human beings cannot build a spaceship before certain technologies are in place. 
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In addition, it can be argued that education and experience are essential for people to 
understand the idea of the designer and to be prepared when he delivers these ideas. 
Therefore one cannot merely wait for the designer’s thoughts coming to him. No 
matter what counter-example I make, supporters of the teleological theory can always 
object it by saying that it is designed so. However, suppose that I claim that the 
teleological theory is wrong, then by my claim, there is something complicated that is 
not designed. One would then wonder whether my claim is correct. If my claim is true, 
then as my claim is a complicated thing and therefore is designed by the designer 
(either directly or indirectly through me), the designer of all complicated things 
(either through a direct or an indirect manner) confesses that there is something 
complicated that is not designed, which involves either an inconsistency (that is, 
something is both designed and not designed) or an incompleteness (that is, 
something complicated is not designed). In either case, the Teleological argument will 
be diminished. Therefore, my claim cannot be correct, it must be wrong. As a 
consequence, my claim as a complicated thing is designed (by the designer) to be 
wrong. However, I see no difference between this scenario and Descartes’s famous 
argument of the “evil genius”. This would cast doubts in every Teleological argument: 
since the designer is able to deceive me in complicated things, how can I know that 
Teleological arguments as complicated things are not deceptions?  Therefore, under 
either case (whether my claim is false) the Teleological argument is dubious. 
 
This problem leads to only one possible explanation: I make a mistake in claiming 
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that the teleological claim is wrong. I must misunderstand the designer’s thought. 
However, does the designer also design the mistake? If not, then my mistake, as a 
complicated thing, is not designed, which goes back to the first case in the previous 
paragraph. But if the mistake is designed, then it goes back to the second case in the 
previous paragraph. Therefore, this argument of mistake cannot save the Teleological 
argument. 
 
However, supporters of the teleological theory can still argue that “design” is not 
“control”. They could argue that the designer is not a God-like figure but rather a 
function that applies to everything in the universe—a law that everything is made 
accordingly. However, this claim will go back to the cosmological theory because this 
“designer-equation” functions similarly to the first cause. Therefore, I can refute this 
statement in the same way. 
   
Now I have already examined all three popular theories concerning the origin of the 
universe but none of them can convince me. Since none of these models work, it 
would be reasonable to switch to a different model to check whether it could yield any 








2. The Classical version of Unit Theory 
 
I claim that the basis of the cosmos is a tiny thing called the Unit. I define it as the 
simplest and the most basic component that can exist. In addition, the only essence it 
possesses is randomness. This definition of the Unit implies that Units cannot be 
generally-described and generally-divided. The term “generally-described” means to 
be described by using of measurable standards like mass, size, weight and etc. Note 
that these standards do not include randomness because randomness is not measurable. 
Further, we assert arbitrarily that there are finitely many measurable attributes. The 
term ‘generally-divided’ means to be divided and this division would generate 
sub-beings in the same group (have shared properties) under all circumstances (with 
absolute certainty, that is) If one wants to generally-describe something under a 
certain group, this thing must acquire some shared characteristics among all such 
things (under the same group) that can be abstracted and quantified (the idea of group 
will be discussed later). However, as the most basic component of the universe, Units 
do not acquire any of those shared standards. They are random in terms of all possible 
attributes as well as in every single attribute, and that is the only essence they possess. 
This rules out all shared qualities, for the generality is possible but not necessary 
(guaranteed). It may be possible that all units at some moment share certain qualities, 
but at some other moments, these qualities would not be shared. Since no attribute is 
necessarily shared among all units under the precondition of randomness, it would be 
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absurd to generalize any attribute. As no attribute is universalized among units, one 
cannot describe all units using any attribute but the only shared quality given a priori, 
that is, the randomness of behavior. It is true that science frequently generalizes about 
random events, but there must exist an property to be generalized. In terms of Units, 
as they behave randomly in all attributes, there is simply no such “event” aside from 
randomness that could be generalized upon. Therefore, our claim still holds, that the 
Units cannot be generally-described. It is true that multiple Units, under a certain 
selection can be measured (as stated previously), but no universal criterion can be 
applied to the entire group of Units. Therefore, the term ‘un—generally-measurable’ 
should be considered as being defined under the scope of all Units. 
 
An individual Unit can have multiple properties. However, none of these properties 
can be displayed in every Unit (Units cannot be generally-described, that is). If Units 
can be generally-described, then there must be some portion of all Units that is 
responsible for the shared measurable characteristic that we can use to generalize and 
describe. Consequently, that part of every Unit can be separated from Units as an 
independent being, possessing only the measurable characteristic that this part is 
responsible of. Thus all Units can then be divided into something even more basic. 
One might raise an objection, namely, a property need not be a part. For instance, 
color is a property (attribute), not a part of an object. But color comes into being 
because its object absorbs most parts in the spectrum except the part which is 
responsible for that color. One can reasonably argue that this property of color is 
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originated from the spectrum, which is not a part of the object. However, it is the 
special way of absorption this object acquires that makes it appear as having a certain 
color. This special absorption is however a result from the arrangement of its 
molecules. Therefore, we can simply subtract this special arrangement of molecules 
from this object. Note that after subtraction, neither the part subtracted nor the 
remainder should necessarily be the original object; it could not be an object at all (in 
our example, this special arrangement can hardly be anything). To make this point 
clear, let us imagine a Vienn Diagram consisting three intersecting circles. The entire 
diagram should be considered as an object, and each circle denotes a certain attribute.  
            
Subtracting one attribute from this diagram would leave two broken circles, which 
denotes nothing, not even an object, for it contains no complete circle (attribute). This 
is exactly in case in our color example. The underlying logic of the proposed 
objection is that properties are shared in all parts of a being instead of being inherited 
by only one part. But such objection can be perfectly countered by our Vienn Diagram 
example. The overlapping circles denote that properties are shared by all parts. 
However, this does not imply that we cannot subtract these parts from the object. 
Rather, it only implies that the remainder of such subtraction is not necessarily a being, 
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and that these subtractions cannot be conducted at the same time (for the intersection 
will be subtracted by many times).  
 
Moreover, this proposed objection has another important implication. As stated 
above, color can also be seen as a property of the spectrum, which is a different being 
from the object we perceive. It may lead to a conclusion that the property of a being 
may not necessarily be correspond by a part of this being, but rather by something 
exists outside this being. But this rationale does not hold. As in our example, the 
special arrangement of molecules of the object is also a necessary condition for color, 
it is simply impossible for a property to be possessed by an object if this property is 
nor inherited by this object’s parts but by something that exists completely outside 
this object. The reason for this claim is rather obvious: if a property exists 
independently from the perceived object, there is simply no interaction between this 
property and the object. In the color example, the property of color is accounted by 
both the light and the special arrangement of the molecules in the object perceived. 
Since this property is inherited by parts of this object, we can therefore perceive this 
property from this object. On the contrary, for a property that exists entirely 
independent from the object perceived, say the wave-particle duality of light, which 
exists solely on photons, cannot be perceived from our object. Consequently, it is 
impossible for a property that exists solely independent from an object to be reflected 
by this object. Therefore, our previous assertion, that if there is a shared property 
among beings under the same group, there must exist a shared part that corresponds to 
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such property still holds before the proposed objection. 
 
Now one might raise another objection. In the Vienn Diagram illustration, what we 
have is simply intersection of circles but not an overlapping one. That is to say, it is 
possible for all “parts” of a being to share one property. I would claim such property 
does not exist. Since this property overlaps the being entirely, it is identical to the 
being. Let us denote such property as P while other properties as Pi , and our being as 
B. According to what we have described previously, the shared property P completely 
overlaps the shape of the entire being. Therefore, subtracting this property from the 
being will leave nothing left, that is, B-P=0. Furthermore, we know that B consists of 
certain other properties, and the combination of all these properties that are not 
contained by P (if they are contained by P, they are not different properties but 
particular representations of P) results in B, for if the combination is not B, then P 
cannot overlap with the entire B. That is to say, B =   for all i. Therefore, we 
would have P =  , that is, the shared property is the union of all other properties 
that this being B has. The equivalent relation here implies that the shared property is 
identical to the union of all other properties of this being B. This overlapping property 
is therefore not a single property but a collaboration of properties (the union of Pi). 
Thus, this objection of a completely shared property does not hold, for such property 
is not a property at all (but a result of properties held together). One may object this 
claim by asking “what about mass?” Let us look at photon for example: a photon has 
no rest mass (Other such particles include Gluon and Graviton). All elementary 
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particles gain their mass through a special kind of particle called Higgs Boson (or 
Higgs particles, which is confirmed in 2013). Without the impact of this special 
particle, no elementary particle would have any mass. Therefore, we can again 
separate out all Higgs Boson (in principle) that corresponds to the property of mass as 
a being (under certain group), which is called Higgs Boson. 
 
  For now we have properly responded to all objections, and solidified our claim 
that if Units can be generally-described, they can be generally-divided. By the rule of 
contraposition, we now arrive at the conclusion that if Units cannot be 
generally-divided, they cannot be generally-described.  
 
Meanwhile, if all Units cannot be generally-described, by definition no shared 
property can be generalized from all Units. Let us assume that Units can be 
generally-divided. Then by assumption there is a certain part inherited by every Unit 
that can be subtracted from all Units. As we have shown previously, this part must 
correspond to certain property. Since this part is shared by all Units, this property is 
shared by all Units. By definition this means that Units can be generally-described, 
thus violating our antecedent that Units cannot be generally-described. Therefore our 
assumption is false, and we must conclude that if Units cannot be generally described, 
they cannot be generally-divided. 
 
Now we have a bicondition: if Units cannot be generally-described then it cannot 
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be generally divided, and if Units cannot be generally divided, it cannot be generally 
described. This is not a cyclical reasoning but simply two sides of one coin. The 
definition of Units necessarily entails these two aspects, which are proved in the 
beginning of this section, and these two aspects, as shown above, are the same. This 




                       The randomness of Units 
 
Cannot be generally-described (measured)           Cannot be generally-divided 
 
                         The nature of Units 
 
  
According to the definition, Units behave chaotically. If Units follow a certain rule, 
then they can both be completely-measured all the time according to that rule (it is 
certainly possible that a Unit can be measured at a time but not over time) and be 
divided (some part of its essence must be responsible for obeying that rule and thus 
can be divided). However, as the number of Unit is enormous, many Units happen to 
behave similarly (not identically). As we stated before, no character is shared by every 
Unit, but this does not imply that a character cannot happen to appear among some 
21 
 
Units. Since both there is no restriction on each Unit’s behavior, the number of 
measurements is limited, and the number of Units is extremely large, Units shall 
generally feature as the normal distribution in terms of all descriptive measurements 
(not individual measurement but all measurements as a whole): although each 
individual acts randomly, in general a certain group of Units may seem to act 
according to specific laws. However, these laws that Units in general appear to follow 
cannot be used to measure them because not every Unit follows these laws---these 
laws are merely results of the large number (as we stated before, no property is 
necessarily universal). Furthermore, due to the complete randomness of Units, they 
also feature a normal distribution in each measurement. Therefore we have two axis 
of normal distribution: the normal distribution among different measurements and the 
normal distribution within each measurement. For instance, it is possible that only 5% 
Units acquire a single measurement called mass, while 70% acquire both mass and 
velocity. That is a partial reflection on Units in behaving randomly among different 
measurements. Within each measurement (like mass), the quantity of that 
measurement each unit within a certain group (not all Units) acquires would again 
show a normal pattern. Thus, the overall graph of Units would become a three 
dimensional dune, and each slice passing the center of this three dimensional graph 
would feature a perfect normal distribution (each vertical slice that does not pass the 
center, however, would be normal-like distribution/k-distribution. We still call them 
normal due to their similarities for the purpose of convenience, although such usage is 
not that accurate in terms of Math. However, this will not affect any conclusions, and 
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The graph of the normal distribution 
 
The general pattern of all Units in every possible measurement 
 
However, one can always question: “How can we describe Units if they behave 
randomly and we cannot measure them?” As addressed in the prior paragraph, 
although every Unit behaves randomly, they in general seem to obtain some common 
patterns due to the law of large numbers, that is, given a sufficiently large number of 
observations on the behavior of Units, the result will converge to the expected value, 
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which is the mean of the normal distribution. Therefore, we cannot describe Units 
accurately, but we can give an approximation infinitely close to the actual state by 
slicing the general distribution (the three dimensional dune) into sufficiently small 
sections, that is, infinitely many slices where each is a normal (or normal-like) 
distribution, and use the mean of each slice as an approximation. This follows the 
same principle as basic calculus. For example, if I examine two randomly-picked 
apples carefully, I can find out that these two apples have lots of differences: size, 
color, weight and etc. It is impossible to find two identical apples, for according to 
Leibniz, if they are identical, they should be the same. However, in spite of so many 
differences, we still call these two different objects apples. All apples are different 
from each other, yet we still put them under the same category instead of naming 
them as different kinds of pasta. People abstract commonalities among different 
instances. This ability will later on be discussed in the paragraph concerning human 
cognition. However, note that there is no way to accurately commonly describe an 
apple: any measurement is an approximation of the actual state. For instance, we say 
that an apple weighs 300g, in single digit accuracy. If we make the accuracy level of 
0.1, its mass could very well be 300.7g, if extend to 0.01, it could be 300.72g. All 
these measurements are approximations of the actual mass, which is unknown. 
Similarly, although one can never accurately commonly describe what exactly a Unit 
is, he can still make approximations, like what people do with our apple. The 
approximation one makes will infinitely approach the exact state, but can never 
achieve it. However, we need to make it clear that the real state of Units is 
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unperceivable due to its random nature. Consequently, this paper is one of the 
approximations, and the theory it proposes is also an approximation (and a fairly good 
one). Its inadequacy will be pointed out later.  
 
This randomness of Units does not imply that the world is unstable---perfect chaos 
is the most stable situation. In the contrast with the common sense, a perfectly 
organized and balanced situation is not stable at all because the balance can be easily 
destroyed by even the smallest disturbance. A balanced equation will easily lean to 
one side where an incremental weight is added. On the contrary, a perfectly chaotic 
situation is very stable because it is already chaotic. Disturbances and changes have 
little impacts on the entire system. The theory of “Entropy Increase” can be used as a 
great example. Entropy represents how chaotic a system is. This theory points out that 
a system will automatically tend to become more chaotic through reactions because it 
is more stable. Similarly, Units behave randomly and achieve the state of perfect 
chaos automatically in order to reach the most stable state. And under this chaotic 
state, the law of big number prevails and general patterns that are shared by Units will 
appear in the greatest extent. 
 
 Because a group of Units acts similarly (not identically) and show a specific 
pattern, this group can be perceived as one entity. Different entities guided by 
different patterns can further form an entity in a higher level. Through this procedure, 




3. Concerning the construction of the cosmos 
----------------- the state of beings, definition of changes and causality 
 
 
The Unit Theory introduced in section 2 seems like another version of the Atomists’ 
theory (although we have already shown one major difference). However, there is 
another major difference between this two models, that is, the Unit Theory holds that 
properties of Units are never certain. Unlike atoms, Units behave randomly. They do 
not abide by any rules or physics laws and the general pattern of Units depend on the 
observation. For the exact state of one single Unit, as stated before, cannot be 
accurately described in ordinary measurements. It has different attributes on different 
observations. Even for a short period of time it indeed possesses certain attributes, the 
magnitudes in these attributes may vary. We could only predict (perhaps even without 
any accountability) that there is an X percent chance that a unit may possess the 
following attributes, and for M attribute it has Y percent chance to score the value A. 
In other words, there is no certainty in a Unit’s character, and the actual state of that 
unit depends solely on the observation. Coin flipping can be used as an analogy. 
Although we know the possibility of the state “face up” to occur is 50%, we never 
know what state the coin will appear in the next toss.  This randomness is a solution 
to the problem brought up by Gödel, as the traditional formal system is itself 
problematic. Further, Modern physics, especially Quantum Physics demands 
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variability in the old mechanical world. However, traditional metaphysics fail to 
incorporate with such demand. This need can be satisfied by the Unit theory. Finally, 
statistic models permits a new solution to access the ‘real state of beings’: through 
brute force. Any complex phenomenon can be duplicated by conducting sampling 
experiment for sufficiently many times. The reason for asserting this randomness as 
well as the implementation of such form will be discussed later in the final section. 
 
As stated before, this randomness of a single Unit does not significantly affect the 
general pattern. As stated previously, since the whole system is already in the state of 
chaos, a disturbance caused by one Unit is negligible. The general pattern of a certain 
group of Units indeed depends on the observation, as every single Unit’s status 
depends on the observation. However, the overall state of a group of Units maintains 
because the possibility of all Units behaving in the same way is astronomically small. 
Even in a two-value situation, letting 500 coins all turns “face-up” coincidentally is 
almost an impossible task, let alone the scenario of a group of trillions Units where 
each facing trillions of choices. Therefore, although almost all Units would change 
their state between two independent observations, they simply change into each other, 
and the general pattern still remains.   
 
This assertion, however, leads to a counter-intuitive situation where everything is 
part of a constant changing process. There is no longer the concept of constancy. 
When we refer to something as staying unchanged, we are actually stating that this 
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subject remains in the array of [X – nσ, X + nσ]. We call this array a cognitive group 
(group as abbreviation). This array also represents the concept of that thing. Here X 
denotes the mean state of all possible states that a being may appear. This is 
represented by the conceptual knowledge that human possess. For instance, when we 
confront the term “apple’, we do not firstly think of a single instance of an apple, not 
the apple I ate this morning nor the one I stole from student dining hall yesterday. 
Rather, we refer to the idea or the concept of apple---an abstract apple. However, the 
relationship between “the form of apple” and apples is not what Plato suggests as the 
relationship between a perfect apple and its incompetent mimics. In fact, it is a 
relationship between a compromised average of all possible observation states and a 
single observation. In Kant’s terminology, this mean is the mean not because it 
exemplifies something, but because it falls in short of nothing, that is, it cannot be 
denied by any criteria under that group.  Here the mean is not an objective mean of 
Units (or composition of Units), as it is simply nonsense to talk about an objective 
mean of Units—it cannot be cognized (stated previously). To take a mean is simply to 
manually take a slice the three dimensional dune we used previously. As each mean 
represents certain concept, the action of picking a mean is simply the action of 
choosing the object (of beings) that we wish to conceive. The σ here denotes the 
variation of Units (or composition of Units as beings) from the average (mean), which 
is an objective figure embedded by the normal distribution we discussed previously. 
This variation is pre-determined by the nature X we choose. That is to say, for any 
arbitrary mean, the range of variation of beings rest around this concept is determined 
28 
 
by the mean. This variation is objective in the sense that it is independent from human 
will once the mean is chosen. As we stated above, to pick a mean is to take a slice of 
the three-dimensional dune. Whether this slice is flat or slim depends on the position 
of the slice. 
 
Echoing our last claim in the last paragraph, one might argue that for some concept, 
we have a much more rigorous criterion compared to other concepts. For instance, we 
are very strict with beings that are qualified for the concept “a red square brick”, but 
we get quite lax dealing with beings that are qualified for the concept of “red”. If the 
variation in any selected concept is objective, then how could we explain this 
difference (narrowing)? This question is answered by the parameter n that precedes σ 
in the array. It denotes as the magnitude of variations that humans accept as “being 
within the boundary”. In our example, the n for “red square bricks” is much smaller 
that the n for “red things”. Therefore, to generate a concept is to pick its compromised 
average (form) and the magnitude of variation that we deem as acceptable. 
 
 To summarize this, there is no “objective” group of Units. Humans, for the 
purpose of describing and thus understanding the objective world, subjectively 
categorize Units into different groups of concepts, like chair, apple, tree and etc. 
These concepts are not a single standard of beings but rather arrays of variations. It 
consists both the objective variation and the subjective mean as well as magnitude of 
variations. Although the magnitude of variation (nσ) or the effective acceptable 
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variation is determined subjectively, the actual variation is objectively imbedded by 
the nature of Units. Furthermore, within the boundary of a concept there may exist 
arrays of sub-concepts, but within each sub-concept (which is a specification 
(narrowing) of a general concept. E.g. red apple in terms of apple), observations 
behave in accord with a normal or normal-like distribution pattern. The conceptual 
world, or the experienced world, is therefore an n-dimensional object which is normal 
(in loose terms) in every  dimension, where each dimension is a 
variation-applicable quality. Here the  dimension does not denote any axis in the 
physical world (unlike what we will discuss later) but rather a representation of 
different layers or hierarchies of human thoughts. This does not assert that human 
thinking process has a hierarchical structure, but rather human’s cognition has 
multiple dimensions: each dimension is a measurement we developed to abstract and 
generalize beings in the objective world, and it is through these measurements that we 
‘perceive’ the world. The difference between physical dimension and cognitive 
dimension is therefore stated. Unlike the physical dimension (which only has 11 
layers), the cognitive dimension is capable to fit in infinitude: it is a matrix-based 
mathematical N dimensional space.  
 
We have asserted previously that in general, an arbitrary observation of any group 
of Units shall generally lie within the boundary of [X – nσ, X + nσ]. But this does 
not imply that this observation will always reside in this realm. There is a certain 
possibility that all Units in one observation behave in extreme and thus make the 
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observation outside the given boundary. For instance, there is a possibility that I can 
directly walk through the wall. However, this possibility is so small that even if I bash 
the wall once per second for my entire life, I could not pass through it as what Harry 
Potter does in the train station. Any phenomena are possible, but some are rare 
because their probability of occurrences is utterly low. Since the occurrences of these 
phenomena are so rare, human mind simply approximates their occurrence as 
impossible, for example, we say that it is impossible of one to walk through a wall.  
 
Now that we have finished the discussion concerning groups, we suffice to proceed 
to the discussion of changes. There are only two kinds of changes, namely, changes 
within a group and changes across groups. Firstly, let us start with the easier one: 
changes within a group. As we stated previously, a group is described by a mean (X) 
and a variation (nσ). The specification of a group (the narrowing process) is discussed 
previously, thus we could exclude n from the variation and only pay attention to σ. 
Due to human mind’s complexity, a group that we form rarely contains only one 
dimension (e.g. mass, length, color and etc.). A group with only one dimension is 
called a measurable standard (recall our definition of generally-described in the 
beginning of section 2), or a single group, as being referred to previously. To make 
our argument clear, I shall use an example to illustrate: suppose a single group with 
mean X and variation σ. A typical occurrence within this group will be x, where x - 
 X  is less than our variation σ times the amplitude of restriction n (reflects the 
strictness of our artificial group). A change within a single group is a change in the 
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value x, making it x’. However, its deviation from the mean (x’-X) shall still be less 
than nσ. That is to say, Change within a group is shifting some values concerning 
certain attributes of a being without changing its category. To be more specific, the 
original being lies somewhere in the distribution, and the change within the group 
shifts that being to a different position within that distribution. However, groups do 
not merely contain one dimension. More often, a group formed by human mind 
contains several dimensions, and thus the mean of this group is the combined mean of 
different dimensions. For a group consist multiple dimensions, its variation will not be 
the variation within a single dimension. In fact, different dimensions within a group 
can have different variations. To be more specific, I shall now give an example. 
Suppose our group consist three dimensions, A, B and C, each has a mean (A , B and 
C) and a respective variation(naσa, nbσb, and ncσc). As stated previously, our group can 
be described by a mean and a variation. In this case, these two characters will be 
given in the form of a triplet. Namely, our mean shall be (A , B, C) and variation: 
(naσa, nbσb, ncσc). A common occurrence in this group would be (a,b,c) where a is an 
element of A, b is an element of B and c is an element of C. Clearly, this group 
consisting multiple dimensions is merely a super-group that combines three single 
group (dimension). Therefore, a change within this group is merely a combined single 
group change. In our example, this change will shift our point from (a, b, c) to (a’ b’ 
c’)  
 
After finishing asserting changes that occur within the boundary of one single 
32 
 
group, it will be reasonable to discuss changes among different groups. As stated in 
both Physics and Chemistry, there exist two different kinds of changes: physical 
change, which involves changes in measurement like length, weight, and chemical 
change, which involves the reaction among different beings that transfer them from 
one category to another. Both changes affect individual instances through applying to 
the entire group, since in both Physics and Chemistry we do not talk about changes 
that affect only an individual molecule but rather a group of molecules shifting their 
status. For a random group being arbitrarily selected, we would denote it using 
previous array notation: [X – nσ, X + nσ]. The physical change is hence a function 
that changes the parameter n. For example, the original array represents all ropes that 
have length of five meters. The target array represents all ropes that have length of ten 
meters. The physical change here that we want to describe is called stretching, which 
will shift the original array to the target array. Under this circumstance, the object 
being described is still rope (although it has special requirements), thus making the 
original array a sub-group of the super group which represents all ropes. Therefore, 
the original array that we want to operate on shall inherit properties from the super 
group (this does not change the randomness, for this only states a limitation on the 
range of properties that Units could vary): X shall represent the compromised mean 
of ropes, and n is designated to correspond to all the requirements which include the 
special criterion: length. We shall denote this original array as C1. Applying the 
desired physical change to the group will generate a different array of ropes, that is, 
f(C1)-- C2, where C2 equals [X – mσ, X + mσ]. Here in this new array the mean 
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X will not change, as the general “form” is still ropes. However, the criterion that is 
employed to select qualified ropes changes (from n to m), since now the special 
requirement changes from length five to length ten. By comparing the original array 
and the target array, we can conclude that physical change, therefore, is a function on 
the parameter, n. i.e. a change in possible variation. 
 
In terms of chemical change, the process is similar to the mathematical operation of 
addition. The chemical change involves reactions for at least two beings. However, I 
will only discuss situations where exactly two beings are involved simply for the 
purpose of convenience. Moreover, in the base case, we assume exactly two new 
beings will be generated. All other situations are analogical to the base case. Let us 
denote the two groups arbitrarily selected as C1 and C2, where C1 is denoted as [X1 – 
nσ, X1 + nσ] and C2 is denoted as [X2 – mσ, X2 + mσ]. The chemical change will 
firstly add these two arrays into an intermediate array, which has the mean of X1+X2. 
Then this array will split into two new arrays C3, C4 with means of X3 and X4. In 
addition, X3+X4 shall equal X1+X2. The parameters, n and m for C3 and C4 
respectively, however, are not applicable to the mathematic rule of addition as they 
are arbitrarily designated subjective value. We can simplify this process in the 
following example: there exist two different beings, 1 and 4 (represented by their 
means respectively). The chemical process that generate two new beings will firstly 
combine this two (1+4) and then generate desired new beings (2+3). A chemist would 
probably agree on this, as this assertion follows the general rule that nothing could be 
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created from nothing. The Unit theory does not intend to entirely replace the existing 
theories, but rather a modification of it, like the theory of relativity in terms of classic 
physics. It is not necessary to replace atoms, as in that level of micro-world the 
pattern of Units will not be significant. It will only be significant under at least Quark 
level. In fact, the pattern of electrons has indicated certain pattern of Units. The 
addition on simply real numbers is justified, as all normal distributions are described 
by two criterions: mean and variance. The variance, σ , as stated previously, is 
objective and is only determined by means. Therefore, distributions differ from each 
other only in terms of different means. Adding two distributions is thus adding two 
real numbers. The true process of chemical change is, therefore, the addition of 
different normal distributions. However, as we never perceive things in terms of the 
entire distribution but rather of concepts, which are sub-arrays of distributions 
(groups), we shall manually select an array through either consciously or 
unconsciously selecting acceptable magnitude of variation-----that is to say, to select 
an arbitrary n value. And this sub-array of the already added distribution is one of the 
newly generated substances. The major difference between physical and chemical 
changes, which is depicted in ordinary Chemistry as whether the process involves 
changes on the substance (beings), is depicted in the Unit theory as whether the 
change applies to distributions and thus groups. The array form of chemical changes 
given above in the form of groups (arrays) is not what “really happens” but what is 
conceived by humans. The real chemical change, however, is the quasi addition of 
different normal distributions. After establishing the definition of changes, we can 
35 
 
employ them to construct the rest of the cosmos. 
  
Now we have discussed the Unit-cosmos in a three-dimensional mechanical world. 
We have shown its three-dimensional version of its basis in section two and how it 
could constitute the entire cosmos through changes in the third section. However, to 
make our argument complete, there is still a question that needs to be pondered upon: 
causality. As a matter of human nature, we often consider phenomena under the 
setting of causality. We say propositions like “the gravitational force causes apples to 
fall.” and “the inclination of beings to fulfill their full potential causes apples to fall 
(Aristotle)”, even though the latter in today’s view is clearly false. Our example here 
does reveal an interesting fact. When we assert that one thing causes another, we are 
in fact concluding that the occurrence of the cause necessarily leads to the occurrence 
of the effect. However, this assertion may be fallacious, as what we see in a second 
example. In this case, the occurrence of the cause does not necessarily lead to the 
occurrence of the effect. Therefore, what we believe as causes and effects may even 
have no relation at all. This idea is echoed by Hume, who argues that minds associate 
ideas by using causes and effects. Things being related may have no connecting 
principle at all (He calls such relation as Philosophical relations (gives certitude), 
while those have a connecting principle as Natural relations (give connections). 
Causality is the only form of relation that lies within both realms, thus may or may 
not have connecting principles). Instead they are artificially juxtaposed by the mind5.  
                                                             
5
 A Treatise of Human Nature 
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Adopting a similar point, I claim that humans make causal propositions and consider 
phenomena under the setting of causality because of the need of expectation. Being 
able to form accurate expectations allows humans to be prepared for the future, using 
fewer resources to react when the outcome indeed occurs. For example, upon hearing 
wolf howling, we will expect the existence of wolves in surrounding areas. The 
expectation of their existence makes us prepared. One could have made several plans 
(to flee or to fight for instance) before the wolves do appear. Comparing to making 
plans when wolves do appear, this ability to expect and react is crucial for survival. 
Therefore, we claim that it is rather human nature to consider phenomena in terms of 
causes and effects. 
 
Again, since we have already defined groups, there are only two kinds of 
causalities, namely, causality within a group and causality across groups. I shall claim 
that causality within a group is a misperception and can always be decomposed into 
causality among groups. As what we stated before, a group is an artificial category 
that we humans invent to abstract differences from beings, thus generalizing and 
preparing them for cognition. Therefore, beings under the same category are cognized 
as different instantiations (representations) of the same thing, for example, two 
different apples under the group of apples. Since two beings that we shall consider 
belong to the same category, saying one being causes another is to assert that this 
group is capable of causing itself. It therefore becomes self-implementing and 
self-sufficient. That is to say, this group of beings can exist independently from 
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anything else. As we stated before, human beings cognize things in terms of causality, 
the independence of this group separates it from forming causal relationship with any 
other groups, therefore there is no way for human to cognize this group except from 
itself. That is to say, in order to know this group we must know this group, which 
involves circular reasoning. To make a rather loose example, an apple could not cause 
an apple. Surely one would argue that an apple would grow into an apple tree, and 
thus causing the existence of another apple. But this assertion diverges from our 
proposition, as this apple causes an apple tree first, and then the apple tree causes 
another apple. Therefore, any self-causing relationship is a misconception that usually 
involves mediate steps and can therefore be decomposed into intermediate 
cross-group causal relationships.  
 
Now for the purpose of convenience, let us simply discuss the easiest kind of  
cross-group causal relationship, namely A causes B, where A and B denote different 
groups. Note here that we use groups instead of instances, as causality involves 
certain generality. An instance-only-based causality is meaningless. As causality is 
used for forming future prediction, a causal relation that could only apply to one 
single instance is not useful at all. There is simply no incentive for human beings to 
form such relationship. Therefore, any causal relationship is an onto mapping 
(surjective function, that is, all elements in the image set are mapped by elements in 
the domain) from one group to the other. Surely, one would argue that it is fairly 
common for one to assert single instance-based causality. For example, we could say 
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that “this stab causes Caesar’s death” where “this stab” is an instance and Caesar is 
also an instance. However, this assertion again is a misperception. It is an instantiation 
of a more general causality: stabs cause human death. Thus we shall not call such 
assertion as an instance-based causal relationship, but rather an instantiation of a 
causal relationship. Surely one would argue that generality cannot exist without 
instances, i.e., it is from the observations of many instances that the generality raises. 
Therefore it is wrong to dismiss instance-based causality. This objection is only 
partially true, for it involves wrong terminology. Under our theoretical framework, 
instance-based causalities are just single observations. They lack generality which is 
essential for making future predictions, which is the essence of causality. 
Instance-based “causality” is meaningless because it cannot be called as causality, not 
because there is no such correlation between the appearances of two instances. One 
may ask, “why generality is one of the major characteristics of causality?” Recall our 
definition of causality: it is a cognitive representation of the high probability of two 
instances  
 
Let us assume a scenario where A causes B, and the causal relationship is denoted 
as f. Since A is an (artificial/ cognitive) group, it is generated to represent a certain 
array of similar beings, denoting as ai, where i is any natural number. Similarly, B is a 
group that represent a certain array of similar beings, denoting as bi, where is is any 
natural number. The causal function f is formed when an occurrence of an arbitrary ai 
coincides with an occurrence of an arbitrary bi in high frequency (of which we do not 
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know exactly the number, and in each frequency bi is not necessarily the same). This 
assertion eliminates the necessity from causality. A cause no longer necessarily results 
in an effect. There can be situations where the occurrence of a cause coincides with 
nothing. We therefore reduce necessity into probability, certainty into coincidences. 
This is the final step to break down the traditional mechanistic metaphysics: as long as 
the necessary casual relationships still exist, our cosmos cannot be completely random 
even under the setting of random Units. Before winding up our discussion, there is a 
final point to be made. This causality only deals with synthetic judgments, and has 
nothing to do with the causality within analytical judgments. Any analytical causality 
belongs to the realm of logics and concerns only artificial concepts without 
instantiations. The statement “A necessarily causes B” without synthetically 
instantiate A and B (in our example above, we assert that A and B are different groups 
that represent certain beings, which is an instantiation) is a totally legitimate 
proposition. Mathematics and Logics are therefore preserved.     
 
 Now we have finished our construction of Unit theory based metaphysics. 
However, these are all “classical” constructions of the cosmos, which is rather 
mechanical. This classical construction fails to recognize the potential of the Unit 
Theory in two ways, that it firstly fails to fully exploit its essential feature of 
randomness and secondly it fails to integrate time into the mechanical 
three-dimensional world: everything being discussed previously is timeless. Since we 
have stated that all beings under Unit Theory are not certain substances but 
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possibilities of featuring different states, integrating time into the classical theory will 
lead to the creation of parallel worlds in higher dimensions. I therefore propose the 
general version of Unit Theory, which addresses the two failures of the classical 




4. The general version of the Unit Theory 
    
Before integrating time into the Unit Theory, it is necessary for us to determine 
what time is. First of all, it is necessary to determine the form of existence of time: 
whether time exists as a physical being or as a concept. That is to say, whether time is 
a compound of Units that is a distribution and thus can be approximated by invented 
arrays or it is already an approximation that is employed in describing distributions. 
The first option corresponds to the existence as an object in the physical world (as a 
form of single or combined units), while the second corresponds to the existence as a 
concept, which is a human invention that involves groups (conceptual representation 
of beings, which involves variations), pure concepts (just one value instead of 
variations like a group, e.g. mathematical concepts. This belongs to the analytic realm, 
which we shall not discuss), or relationships (functions that map one group to the 
other). An existence outside these two realms is unimaginable. According to existing 
evidence, it will be absurd to say that certain particles compose time through different 
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combinations. Rather, time is used to capture the differences that occur among 
different observations. Therefore, I must cast aside the thought that the determinant of 
time is something physical and claim that time is a concept. This concept, as stated 
above, includes two essential features: firstly, it involves multiple observations, and 
secondly, there must be differences among these observations. This concept of time 
we use here is rather an Aristotelian one, which states that if there is no change, there 
is no time. This may seems absurd at the first glance, but as we stated above, time is a 
concept invented to describe changes (in loose term, a relationship). As long as there 
is a tiny difference among all these Units, there is the lapse of time. However, there 
exists a possibility that all Units appear in the same state between two adjoined 
observations (although this possibility is utterly small). In this case, time is indeed 
static between these two observations. But we will be unaware of such situation, as 
there is simply no way to cognize such situation. 
 
However, so far we only showed what time is. It is reasonable for one to ask “how 
could we measure time?” As we discussed in previous sections, we use conceptual 
approximations that enable abstract thinking and communications. These conceptual 
approximations ignore extremities that are almost impossible to occur. In this case, the 
extremity is the stasis of time. Since each time when we make an observation (we 
assume that making observations cost no time at each attempt), there are some 
differences; we then automatically assume the continuity of time. Note here both 
differences and our perceptions are in three dimensions. What we truly perceive is in 
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fact scattered three dimensional images: 
 
 A      B        C     D    E      F     G     (what we truly perceive) 
 
However, due to the persistence of vision, we tend to believe that these scattered 
phases are continuous.  
 A                                        G       (what we think)  
 
In terms of time, we shall have following similar graphs  
 
 A   t1’   B   t2’  C  t3’  D    t4’   E  t5’  F   (what we truly perceive) 
     
Since observation A is different from observation B, by definition there exist time 
between A and B, namely t1. Similarly, we have t2, t3 and etc. Note that there is no 
time at A, B, C and etc., for we have assumed the time-costlessness of observations. 
Instead of scattered phases, what we believe that actually happens is now a continuous 
movement from phase A to G 
 
 A    t1    t2     t3     t4    t5       F       (what we think)  
 
However, this belief would also make time continuous. The continuity of the concept 
of movements entails the continuity of time. We therefore believe that time is parallel 
to a uniform line. In physics, it is often perceived as the fourth dimension. 
 
Now let us integrate the concept of time into our classical Unit Theory. Since the 
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concept of time implies multiple observations and differences among observations, 
we are justified to give the following example. 
 
Suppose the entire cosmos has three different states, A, B and C with possibilities of 
20%, 60% and 20% respectively. We only make two observations. Then all the 
potential consequences of changing sequence are: A-B, A-C, B-C, B-A, C-A and C-B. 
Instances as A-A, B-B and C-C are eliminated because although the possibility of their 
occurrence is considerable in this simplified example, it is astronomically low in real 
life. In addition, these sequences are meaningless as they are all unperceivable. 
Furthermore, sequence A-B is distinct from sequence B-A, for the former starts with 
cosmos A and ends with cosmos B while the later starts with cosmos B and ends with 
cosmos A. In this scenario, we have six distinct sequences of cosmos. Before making 
any observation, one does not know which sequence he will end up with. But once 
he makes an observation, he has been determined randomly in one of these six 
sequences. If we call each sequence a distinct ‘world line’ then in this scenario, we 
have six parallel world lines. In the real world, as the cosmos is consisted with 
countless numbers of Units, there exist countless amounts of states that it could 
appear. We shall denote the number of all possible states as M, and further denote 
the number of observations (which is also astronomically large) as N, then the 
number of world lines would be: 




The general Unit Theory therefore states that due to the randomness of each 
individual Unit, the whole cosmos is in a possibility cloud. The uncertainty of the 
cosmos consequently results in the existence of different world lines. What specific 
world line that we are in depends on the result of corresponding observation. Before 
observation, there exist many possible world lines that we could step in. However, 
after the conduction of the observation, the specific world line is determined, and all 
other lines will collapse. This is compatible with the Copenhagen Solution in 
Quantum Physics, which will be elaborated in the last section. In addition, this is 
compatible with the common belief that there are many futures but a determined 
past. After all, one intention of bringing in the notion of randomness into 
metaphysics is to secure free will from a mechanic cosmos (which is always 
associated with determinism). However, one might wonder if under the Unit theory, 
level things are deterministic at the macro level given our earlier discussion on 
changes (especially Chemical changes). This concern, fortunately, is not valid, and the 
macro level is not deterministic. All the contents in our earlier discussion on changes 
only describe what will happen when such changes do occur. There is no guarantee 
that these changes will necessarily occur. Therefore, the macro level is not 
deterministic at all. 
 
The classical Unit Theory offers a three-dimensional interpretation of the Cosmos. 
However, the general theory offers a full version of the cosmos. Before stating the 
reason for this assertion, we shall firstly figure out the method of moving up from 
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lower dimensions to higher dimensions. To achieve that, we need to consider the 
current dimension as a point, and suppose another similar point. Then the higher 
dimension will be the line that links these two points together. Let us start from the 
first dimension. The first dimension is just a line that links two non-dimensional 
points, which features only length with neither height nor width. Now consider the 
second dimension. Following our methodology, assuming this line as point and 
imagine a similar point which is different from this point. The line that links these 
two points will give a width to the 1
st
 dimension and make it the second dimension. 
From analytic geometry, we know that any vectors in this second dimension can be 
represented by certain product of the length vector and the width vector. Therefore 
the second dimension is just the sum of all lines in one plane. Now assuming all the 
lines in a plane as a point, and assume another similar point, then the line 
connecting these two points will be a line that connect these two planes, which gives 
the height to the system. Again by analytical geometry, any vectors in this space can 
be represented by certain products of length width and height.  A three 
dimensional world in the fourth dimension is a three dimensional moment placed in 
time, which is merely an observation with no time background (recall our argument 
about time in previous paragraphs). Only when there is another observation could 
we form the sense of time, that is, forming a line between two static 
three-dimensional observations. The fourth dimension is such linkage between two 
neighboring three-dimensional observations (the line that links two three dimensions 
as points). This only gives temporal sense to the three dimensional world instead of 
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forming any time line. The linkage may seem to be a world line but is not. For this 
linkage links only two points (observations) without involving a third point. Therefore 
it simply denotes an instance in time flow and should only be called as a moment (or 
now if you prefer). Now (literally) for a fifth dimension, we shall use the previous 
strategy and treat this fourth dimensional world as a point A. Suppose another point 
B, which is another moment in the timeline. Clearly, asserting another point will 
create a sequential order of the two existing points. Note here that the asserted 
point cannot happen in the past, for all past events are determined and is no longer 
in the timeline. This movement forms a sequence A-B, where A denotes a given now 
and B denotes a point in the future, and we call this line as a world line. This may 
seem a little bit abstract to understand. I shall therefore make an analogy to the first 
dimension as a clarification. Remember the fourth dimension only gives the temporal 
sense in the system, i.e., the fourth dimension is just a moment in time flow. We can 
parallel it with our zero-dimensional point. Imagining another point is to assert 
another time moment. Then the line than links these two points will only give the 
length to the system, that is, a special time line from a point to another. We call this 
line “world line” here. Now for the sixth dimension, we shall imagine the fifth 
dimension as a point, and then imagine a similar point. This point can therefore be 
denoted as A-C, where C is a forth dimensional future that differs from B. Then the 
sixth dimension is the way jumping from sequence A-B to sequence A-C. In an 
analogy to the second dimension, this sixth dimension adds “width” to the previous 
fifth dimension, where there is only “length”. Note here that both sequence starts 
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from A, since it denotes the current three-dimensional cosmos that is already 
determined. As the sixth dimension is a way to jump from one sequence starting 
from A to another sequence starting from A, we can plainly say that a sixth 
dimensional movement is a movement that jumps across different futures. Making 
the sixth dimension a point, the other point shall be a similar such jump, say from 
A-C to A-D, then the line that links these two points is a switch between different 
jumps. In an analogy to the third dimension, this seventh dimension adds “width” to 
the system. Therefore, the seventh dimension is the summation of all possible 
futures of a given “now” A. Now proceeding to the eighth dimension, we assume the 
seventh dimension as a point, then another point would be all possible futures 
starting from a different given “now”, say B. The linkage between these two points 
will therefore become the eighth dimension, that is, a jump from all possible world 
lines starting from the current world to the summation of all possible world lines 
from a different current world. To put it loosely, such jump is an action of changing 
the past. it is a function from A-X to B-X, where X can be instantiate by any futures. 
Now let us imagine this function as a point, and then assume another similar point, 
which denotes the function from C-X to D-X.  The ninth dimension is therefore the 
collection of all such jumps. That is to say, the ninth dimension is the summation of 
all possible cosmos sequences starting with different initial cosmos-----a summation 
of A-F, B-C, D-E and etc. Using the same rule on the ninth dimension, all possible 
cosmos sequences become a point in the tenth dimension, and that 
tenth-dimensional point is what we call the true cosmos C. it is simply logically 
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impossible to imagine another such point, for the point of true cosmos C has already 
included all possible past and all possible future. This set is simply inaugmentable. 
For any being b you could possibly imagine, b belongs to C. This tenth dimensional 
interpretation is not contradictory with our three-dimensional classical Unit Theory 
interpretation, since it is the randomness of the three-dimensional cosmos that 
enables the existence of the fifth and other higher dimensions. Namely, the 
randomness of Units enables the possibility of a different future, for any 
representation we have could be represented differently simply by the randomness 
of Units, and this different future can be achieved, which is guaranteed by the nature 
of causality which we established in the previous section, for given an initial 
condition, its effect (a future) is not determined but a matter of possibilities. 
Therefore, the three dimensional representation, or the classic version of the Unit 
theory, guarantees the general Units theory, and thus is not a contradiction to it. 
Now we have reached the end of our long inquiry. The general theory of Unit states 
that: 
 









5. The representation of Unit Theory 
 
In previous sections, the Unit Theory is represented by using set theory. I will further 
claim that the entire theory can be represented by a formal system, which is based 
on the set theory. As we know, the credibility of a formal system is challenged by 
Goedel’s theorem. However, I claim that Goedel’s theorem is not a contradiction of 
the formal system if given a proper interpretation of the latter (this interpretation is 
the Unit Theory). The inadequacy of the formal system is a necessary result of the 
randomness once asserting the formal system as a representation of the Cosmos 
under Unit Theory. Although Goedel’s theorem is indeed a threat to formal systems 
in general, it is not a threat to a specific system where the inadequacy it inherits is no 
longer a drawback but the only possible representation. To support this argument, I 
shall show in the following section that the inadequacy of a formal system also has 
significant meaning in representing the Cosmos under the framework of the Unit 
Theory, but before that, I will clarify that the formal system used in this thesis is the 
formal system used in the Typographical Number Theory (TNT). 
 
Firstly, we shall briefly introduce Goedel’s proof of his theorem. Goedel’s core idea is 
to create a well-defined paradox similar to the statement “this sentence is false” in 
the formal system, which involves self-referencing. The trick is, assigning either true 
or false to this paradox will consequentially assign the opposite value to it at the 
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same time, thus making the system able to prove both the statement and its 
negation, which is apparently a violation of the definition of consistency. To maintain 
its position as being consistent, the system must not determine the value of this 
self-referencing statement, making the system incomplete since this paradox----a 
well-defined formula---cannot be shown by using formal deduction on the system. 
However, creating a self-referencing formula in a formal system is difficult. To achieve 
that, Goedel adopts a method called “Goedel Numbering”, which assigns each 
symbol used by the system a unique Goedel number. By doing so he manages to 
represent elements of this system in the form of numbers. (We will put aside the 
number-assigning of proofs now for the purpose of convenience. However, in later 
argument this assignment becomes important, and we will pick it up in due course). 
Goedel then proceeds to a special function called substitution, which substitute all 
free occurrences of one variable in a well-defined formula with another variable. 
Specifically, Goedel focuses on one particular substitution formula denoting as sub(y, 
33, y). This function denotes the process of substituting every free variable having 
the assigned value of 33 with y in a function whose code is itself y. Then he proposes 
the following assertion: there is no such proof in the system that is obtained from 
sub(y, 33, y). This assertion consists of symbols used by the system, and thus has its 
own assigned Goedel Number, denoting it as q. Now let us substitute every free y in 
the previous assertion with q and we will have “there is no such proof in the system 
that is obtained from sub(q, 33, q)”. But this new assertion is obtained from the very 
process of sub(q, 33, q). Therefore, this new assertion in fact asserts its own 
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improvability. If we can prove this assertion, then it is not provable, however, if we 
cannot prove this assertion, then it cannot prove that itself is not provable, thus 
making it conversely provable. As a result, this well-formed formula is the one 
Goedel is seeking for: it is both provable and refutable at the same time.  
 
In the Unit Theory, we know that due to the randomness, the actual state of a Unit is 
in a possibility cloud. Suppose that a Unit, A, has two different states A1 and A2 
(under which we do not know). If we conduct an observation on this Unit, the result 
could either be A1 or A2 (not both), but before this observation, the state of A is a 
mixture of both A1 and A2, even under the premise that A1 and A2 are exclusive 
from each other. This state of mixture of exclusive states is called Quantum 
Superposition in Quantum Physics. I will borrow this term and use it in the following 
discussion. Similarly in the macro world, before making any observation, the existing 
world is the initial condition, denoting as A. We know from previous discussions that 
it could lead to different world lines such as A-B and A-C. This link between the micro 
level Unit theory and the macro level can be easily accomplished through conducting 
the experiment called Schrodinger’s cat. The Unit Theory version of this experiments 
states that there is a cat in a box, which is linked with a special device. This device 
contains a Unit, which has fifty percent probability of behaving in state A within an 
hour and fifty percent probability of behaving in state B. If the observed condition is 
A, poisonous gas will be released and kill the cat consequently, not if otherwise. 
During this hour of experiment, as the Unit is under the Quantum Superposition of 
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both A and B. the cat is also under the Quantum Superposition of being both dead 
and alive, or logically equivalent, that the cat is neither dead nor alive. But when we 
make the observation, only one condition could be true: the cat is either dead or 
alive, not both. 
 
After these two introductions, one may have already sensed the similarity between 
Unit Theory and Goedel’s proof. In Goedel’s proof, a well-defined formula is both true 
and false in the formal system if being assigned either value, while in the Unit Theory; 
the cat is neither dead nor alive. Since the formal system upon which Goedel’s proof 
builds on is purely syntactical, we can therefore develop a special interpretation that 
relates this pure syntax with semantic meanings. This interpretation is therefore the 
formal representation of the Unit Theory   
 
The formal system to which we assign the Unit Theory is the Typographical Number 
Theory (TNT). As a formal system, the Unit Theory naturally satisfies the 
pre-conditions for Goedel’s theory. Let us assume that variable y denotes the object 
under Quantum Superposition, and q as the poor cat in the experiment. Therefore, 
when we talk about the condition of the cat, we are in fact substituting the variable y 
with q (or rather an instantiation). Let function f(y) returns 1 if it is provable in TNT 
that sub(y, 33, y), 0 if otherwise. As shown previously, if sub(q, 33, q) is provable, 
sub(q, 33, q) is refutable, which gives function f(q) 1 and 0 at the same time. Further, 
if sub(q, 33, q) is not provable, then sub(q, 33, q) is provable, which again gives 
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function f(q) the value of 1 and 0 at the same time. Let as assign function f(x) the 
semantic meaning of “the condition of the object” while 1 denotes being alive and 0 
being dead. What we have now is the following: f(q) = 1 iff sub(q, 33, q) is provable 
or f(q) = 0 iff sub(q, 33, q) is not provable. In previous steps, we get both f(q)=1 and 
f(q)=0 at the same time, which in ordinary English reads as “the cat is both dead and 
alive”. This inconsistency may be absurd in Mathematics, but it has real meanings in 
the Unit Theory. It is rather a necessary condition for Unit Theory to be legitimately 
presented in formal system. This “problem” of a formal system in fact has real 
meaning. It reflects the indeterminacy of the future world line, and this 
indeterminacy is installed by nothing but the randomness of Units and of causality. 
 
However, our inquiry shall not end here. As we assert at the beginning that the 
formal system used to represent Quantum Physics is TNT, which entails that the 
formal system is consistent, it cannot contain a proposition that consist both a 
statement and its negation. Thus the function sub(q, 33, q) is neither provable nor 
refutable. It must be undecided, making f(q) neither 1 nor 0, or “the cat is neither 
dead nor alive”, which is exactly what the state of the cat is before the observation. 
In macro-cosmos level, we shall denote the set of TNT as the cosmos C. We shall also 
denote set D as the definite cosmos, where D is obtained by D= TNT – {x| x is a 
Goedel sentence}, that is, eliminating (subtracting, in Set theory terms) the Goedel 
sentence from the TNT, making the remaining system (set) decidable. This set D is 
intended to include all decidable formulas that are also consistent. However, this 
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intention could never be fulfilled as long as D could still support some proportion of 
arithmetic, for the general abstraction of Goedel’s first theorem dictates that all such 
sets (D) must contain some well-defined formula that can neither be provable nor 
refutable as long as the set is consistent. We cannot therefore obtain the set D, not 
because we cannot determine what is provable in system of D (or elements of set D) 
but rather because we cannot determine elements that do not belong to D. To 
elaborate on this for a bit, we can re-write the criterion of set D as “for all x, x 
belongs to D iff x is provable in TNT.” Since TNT is semi-decidable, we can produce 
the provable elements of set TNT in a mechanical and effective manner. However, we 
cannot mechanically produce elements of set TNT that are not provable due to its 
semi-decidability. Therefore, we do not know what undeterminable propositions 
should be subtracted from TNT, and we could never exhaust non-provable formulas 
from TNT: there are infinitely many non-provable formulas in TNT. As a consequence, 
we cannot use enumeration but only an algorithm to deplete them. But such 
algorithm could never exist, for there is no way to use syntax in TNT to determine 
which formula is non-provable. In this sense, the set D is only recursively enumerable. 
That is to say, upon seeing a proposition, we can decide whether it belongs to D or 
not, but we could never use any algorithm to systematically find out everything 
belongs to this set. In real world representation, if we denote D as the definite 
known world, this result would yield an interesting interpretation: the process of 
enumerating propositions is the process of making observations. Each proposition 
corresponds to a real world phenomenon, and the set D represents the known 
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(observed/past) world, while the set to be subtracted includes all superpositions of 
which the observation is not yet made.  
 
In the previous discussion, we talked about different world lines, and how we could 
shift from A-B to A-C, for instance. However, it is reasonable to ask what happens to 
all other world lines once we enter a specific line (make an observation). That is, 
whether other world lines collapse or they still exist. The former is supported by the 
Copenhagen School while the latter is supported by the theory of Parallel Universes. 
In the section of the General Unit Theory, we claim that it is compatible with the 
Copenhagen School. However, the adoption of the formal system as the 
representation could actually lead to reconciliation between these two schools. The 
Copenhagen school claims that other world lines would collapse upon observation. 
In essence, this states that upon observation, the actual state of the cat will 
transform into one definite result from the superposition. In formal system, this can 
be paraphrased as assigning either sub(q, 33, q) or ~sub(q, 33, q) as an axiom in TNT. 
As we know, asserting sub(q, 33, q) as the axiom cannot avoid the grasp Goedel’s 
theory. The new TNT still consist of formulas that can be neither proved nor refuted. 
In interpretation, this assignment asserts the final condition of the cat. It does not 
assert the result of other superpositions. Moreover, as it only assigns one side, the 
system is still consistent, and is applicable for Goedel’s theory (again). However, the 
assignment of ~sub(q, 33, q) would make the system inconsistent. On the one hand, 
it proves sub(q, 33, q), on the other hand, it denies every natural number to be the 
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Goedel number of such proof. That is, one cannot find a natural number such that it 
is the Goedel number of the proof of sub(q, 33, q). It is only a supernatural number P 
that serves as the corresponding Goedel number of our proof. And this supernatural 
number P is larger than any natural number (it must be infinitely large). This number, 
P, is the key to our reconciliation. 
 
To clarify on the reconciliation, we need firstly discuss the interpretation of the 
formal system for the School of Parallel Universes. This school states that both A-B 
and A-C exist after observation---the universe split into two parallel ones: one with a 
living cat while the other has a dead cat. The observer will know that he enters the 
universe of a living cat if on observation, the cat is alive, and he will know that he 
enters the universe of a dead cat if otherwise. In this case, we have two parallel 
formal systems, denoting as TNT1 (the consequence B of the world line A-B) and 
TNT2 (the consequence C of the world line A-C). Each is obtained by assigning either 
sub(q, 33, q) or ~sub(q, 33, q) to the original TNT (initial condition A—the existing 
cosmos) system. Moreover, since there are an equal number of elements in the set of 
TNT and the set of TNT1, we can form a one to one (and also onto) mapping between 
two sets. We call this mapping (function) as function 1 (a five dimensional movement 
from A to B, forming the world line A-B), denoting as f1. Similarly, we can also get f2 
which is a one to one (and also onto) function between set of TNT and of TNT2 
( similarly, it is actually world line A-C). Upon observation, the observer will move 
into both f1 and f2 (thus forming parallel universes. In some sense, this is no longer 
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“the observer” anymore: he splits into the observer in B and the observer in C), 
however, as these two sets (set TNT1 and set TNT2) are incoherent, there is no 
inter-universe transmission (a fifth dimensional movement, which is infeasible for 
humans), making the observer in each universe only aware of one outcome.  
 
Now let us return to the Copenhagen School, the second condition is in fact a narrow 
version of the parallel universes scenario: it features what an observer in one of the 
parallel world faces. There is a world where sub(q, 33, q) is provable, however, no 
natural number can be assigned to such proof as the Goedel number. It means that 
this scenario (say, the cat is alive) is infeasible (P is infinitely large: larger than all 
possible natural number) in this world where under no condition (no natural number) 
this cat is alive. The inaccessibility of sub(q, 33, q) reflects exactly the assertion of 
parallel universe hypothesis that observers in each world line cannot communicate 
with each other, making them only know one result. In this interpretation of the 
formal system, there is no essential disagreement between these two schools. The 
Copenhagen school is accountable for the observer in one world line (a four 
dimensional explanation), while the parallel universe hypothesis concerns all 
observers in all world lines starting from A (a sixth dimensional explanation). 
 
So far we have addressed the special interpretation of the formal system TNT that 
could be adopted in describing the Unit Theory. We have also shown that Goedel’s 
theory does not appear to be a threat, but in fact a necessary condition for the 
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compatibility between any formal system and the Unit Theory, as this theory reflects 
the very core idea of randomness. Furthermore, we have shown that the special 
interpretation could bridge the gap between two opposing schools. All we have done 
in this section states that the inadequacy of a formal system has real meaning if 
assigning Unit Theory as an interpretation of the formal system: it is but the core 
idea and the immediate result of the Unit Theory.  The similarities between the Unit 
theory and the formal system indicates that it is possible to form an isomorphism 
from the Unit Theory to a formal system, which opens the possibility of using a 
































Anselm. Proslogion. La Plata: Universidad Nacional De La Plata, Facultad De Humanidades Y 
Ciencias De La Educación, InsTtuto De FilosoUa, 1950. Print.  
 
Aristotle, and Richard Hope. Physics. [Lincoln]: University of Nebraska, 1961. Print.  
 
Berto, Francesco. There's Something about Gödel: The Complete Guide to the Incompleteness 
Theorem. Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009. Print.  
 
Bryanton, Rob. Imagining the Tenth Dimension: A New Way of Thinking about Time and Space. 
Victoria, B.C.: Trafford, 2006. Print.  
 
Descartes, René. Meditations on First Philosophy. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1960. Print. 
  
Gödel, Kurt. On Formally Undecidable Propositions of Principia Mathematica and Related 
Systems. New York: Dover Pubns., 1992. Print.  
 
Hume, David, and Henry David Aiken. Dialogues concerning Natural Religion;. New York: Hafner 
Pub., 1948. Print.  
 
Hume, David, L. A. Selby-Bigge, and P. H. Nidditch. A Treatise of Human Nature. Oxford: 
Clarendon, 1978. Print.  
 
Kant, Immanuel, and Mortimer J. Adler. The Critique of Pure Reasons. Chicago [u.a.: 
Encyclopaedia Britannica, 2003. Print.  
 
Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm, and George R. Montgomery. Discourse on Metaphysics ; 
Correspondence with Arnauld ; Monadology. La Salle, IL: Open Court Pub., 1980. Print. 
